also Sydney Morning Herald 22 March 1997
by Bill Standish
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force have an unfortunate reputation for erratic behaviour which it partially reinforced and contradicted in pressuring its political masters this week.
Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, MBE denies that he is promoting a de facto coup and, although he will challenge his dismissal, has asked the troops to support the replacement Commander of the PNGDF.
In one of many paradoxes, General Singirok may be charged with sedition but has a constitutional defence that having argued in private against the use of mercenaries on Bougainville, he took public action to protect the Constitution.
General Singirok is a former battalion commander on Bougainville who was shot in September 1994 while rescuing soldiers trapped at the exposed Panguna mine site. Much of his last year has been spent attempting to assert authority over his officers, with about sixty soldiers sacked in an effort to restore discipline and morale, especially in the Port Moresby-based 1st Battalion. Although over a hundred troops refused orders to return to Bougainville after Christmas, General Singirok remains a hero.
Following the rushed and inconclusive 1994 peace conference at Arawa, 1995 was a year of local level peace efforts and the pan-Bougainville peace talks at Cairns. Angered by an attack on their returning leaders, BRA assaults on the PNGDF increased in early 1996.
The Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan appeared to accept the line that a surgical strike against the secessionist leadership could resolve the issue, and formally ended the ceasefire. The result was the humiliating failure of the combined infantry battalions in Operation High Speed Two in July 1996.
In August the 50,000-plus people avoiding the conflict in government care centres were hurriedly moved into 'concentration areas'.
A pattern of sexual abuse of women refugees at the Kangu Beach care centre in the southern Buin area provoked former Resistance allies of the PNGDF in September to assist the BRA in killing twelve PNGDF and police guards, several of whom - on the army's own investigation - were drunk on home brew. Their automatic weapons and five hostages are still held by local BRA near Buin.
Then in October the provincial premier, Mr Theodore Miriung was assassinated and in late November an independent inquest found that he had been murdered by some non-commissioned soldiers along with a Resistance fighter. The Port Moresby elite shared the shock and trauma of Bougainvilleans, and confidence in the military was low.
A quick-fix [military] approach combined with a plan to buy out the Bougainville copper mine became the Prime Minister's last throw before the June 1977 election. Some early public comments reflected military sentiment, arguing that this deal was a vote of no-confidence in the military.
The price also irked the cash-strapped PNGDF, who have always blamed chronic under-resourcing for their failures on Bougainville.
Some officers, such as Major Walter Enuma, now commanding the effort to kick out the mercenaries, have long argued publicly that national government authority on Bougainville has to be built in a hearts and minds exercise. Enuma sees a need to build on local community authority structures and gradually restore public order and basic services.
In 1992 Major Enuma reopened the Buin area at the request of local chiefs, and proved an exemplary peacemaker. He won over some key BRA leaders - including one who has since rejoined the rebels, after being attacked by one of Major Enuma's successors in Buin. Unfortunately the political strategies are not widely understood in the PNGDF, many of whom mourn their lost comrades and want to recover lost face. These attitudes are shared by many civilians, and also some MPs.
This kind of bottom-up process of rebuilding authority is encapsulated in a national government peace program being negotiated by Provincial Affairs Minister, Mr Peter Barter, a process which has received the endorsement of Sir Julius.
Mr Barter is popular on Bougainville for delivering medicines while Health Minister. He personally used the funeral in Miriung's village to speak to secessionist leaders, as well talking with prominent Buin leaders during negotiations an attempt in late January to negotiate the hostages' release.
The peace package has been negotiated with other government departments and the Defence Force and the Bougainville provincial government.
The proposal goes against the trend of recent national constitutional changes, which place the provinces under the control of their national MPs.
It involves the continuation of a provincial government for Bougainville and negotiations on possible increases in autonomy. It thereby opens the pathway for moderates to move away from secessionism and remains the only hope for a political peace process.
It is the politics of Bougainville which is behind General Singirok's rejection of prime ministerial authority and appeal to popular support. His statement mentions 'serious negative social, economic and security considerations'. He implies concern at the collateral deaths of villagers and political damage inevitable from use of the new high-tech weaponry imported by Sandline International and Executive Outcomes. He apparently acted to prevent the combined new force being moved to Bougainville.
On Monday General Singirok said 'Those who assisted in the final stages of the contract still maintained that the contract had major flaws and should not be accepted by us ... the political direction was to get on with it and get the contract ready to be signed the following morning'.
Sandline had direct access to the Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Defence Minister, Mr Mathias Ijape, 'and directions are then given to departmental Heads by the Ministers concerned for us to comply'. Having failed to sway the government with private advice, his dramatic intervention was needed to defend human rights and therefore the Constitution.
The General appears to believe that he supports the law, and his public call for Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan and his Deputy and Finance Minister Chris Haiveta to resign carried no explicit threat. General Singirok has calmly and repeatedly asked the government to drop its plans to team the PNGDF with mercenaries, and sought an inquiry.
Half at least of the $US36 million price for the Sandline operation has been paid, even though this secret project (codenamed Oyster) does not use legally appropriated funds. The money come from the sale of State-owned Orogen mining and petroleum shares, which have not been entered into the Budget. The channel is the North Fly Road Company, which has former Finance Department officials as directors.
Funds from Orogen may also be used in the government's proposal to buy out CRA's shares in Bougainville Copper Limited in tandem with Project Oyster. The apparent intent is to settle the Bougainville conflict and then reopen or sell off the mine. Such investment would appear foolhardy, given at least 10 years operation would be needed to recover the restart costs of $500 million and the vulnerability to sabotage and attack of the mine's 25 km long infrastructure.
This week, with his country destabilised and his political future in the balance, Sir Julius swung from resisting diplomatic pressure and mocking Australia's military aid to praising its steadfast support and friendship. On Wednesday he admitted that the Sandline project may not be able to proceed, but sought a price for terminating the jointly -programmed aid clauses in the 1989 Australian aid agreement and in its 1992 update - an agreement which he had signed.
Sir Julius appears now to have lost leverage with Australia, although Australia's input may have helped him on Thursday to decide to concede Singirok's demand for an inquiry into the Sandline deal. Yet Canberra now appears largely irrelevant to Port Moresby's turbulent internal politics.
The PNGDF demand for the resignation of Sir Julius remains unresolved, as does their call for Singirok's reinstatement.
The first revelation of the Sandline project in the Australian media and the Australian parliamentary rejection of mercenaries aroused nationalist resentment in PNG, but the element of surprise had been lost earlier when BRA sympathisers heard of it in London in early February.
Were the mercenary operations to proceed, it now would be even more unlikely to succeed in narrow military terms or the broader political objectives.
Dr Standish, a researcher at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, has lectured at the University of PNG and recently worked at the PNG National Research Institute.