

# **‘The Dynamite to Bring Down the Old Building’?: The Maoist War in Nepal<sup>1</sup>**

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For nearly a decade a People’s War has raged in Nepal. This war may be the last of the peasant wars of the twentieth century, as described by Eric R. Wolf.<sup>2</sup> It may also represent Barrington Moore Jr’s argument that emergent democratic systems in the twentieth century are the resolution of class struggles over the land and its labour force.<sup>3</sup> In land-locked economically-backward agrarian Nepal, where an upper class has retained domination over its peasant labour force, ultimately by the use of violence, the emergence of a fully bourgeois society has, until the present, been prevented. In these circumstances, where power over peasant populations continues, either absolutist regimes maintain their rule, stifling nascent bourgeois classes, or the old regime is overthrown.

## **Origins of the Present Crisis of the Absolutist Order**

Since the early 1990s, Nepal has had the semblance of a functioning democracy.<sup>4</sup> The nation’s political economy, however, registers a society riven with deep and growing inequalities. Seventy-one per cent of Nepal’s population of 24 million exist below the level of absolute poverty. In contrast, the richest 10 per cent of Nepalis hold 59.5 per cent of the national income. Almost 94 per cent of Nepal’s population lives in the nation’s rural areas,

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with subsistence farming families comprising 81 per cent of the population. More than 60 per cent of the population is illiterate.<sup>5</sup>

Nepal's people, overwhelmingly poor rural dwellers, have not been made prosperous through agricultural production.<sup>6</sup> The country's terrain is disparate, with some areas proving fertile and productive, while other territory is mountainous and less suited to agriculture. The growth rate in food grain production in Nepal, for example, has declined markedly during the last 30 years. While food grain production has decreased, the nation's foreign debt has soared. Nepal's foreign debt now constitutes more than 70 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>7</sup> The desperate poverty of those in the nation's poorest provinces has given rise to bonded servitude and slavery as relatively common practices in some areas.<sup>8</sup> Rising numbers of Nepal's people have sought to escape their impoverished circumstances by leaving the countryside. Some are engaged in the tourism industry in the capital, Kathmandu, while many more depart Nepal for India and elsewhere to find paid employment.<sup>9</sup> The remittances expatriate Nepalis send home to their families have become a means of economic survival for many.<sup>10</sup> Social divisions and inequities within Nepal's population have been maintained over generations in this singular Hinduist state by the boundaries of caste.<sup>11</sup>

The poverty of Nepal's population has not entirely escaped international attention. Innumerable international development schemes, sponsored by Nepal's monarch, were introduced to address this problem. These development programmes were legitimised through the Panchayat system. During the second half of the twentieth century Nepal received an estimated US\$5.2 billion in development aid.<sup>12</sup> Despite their existence for more than thirty years, the programmes failed to alleviate the poverty of the populace.<sup>13</sup> The Nepalese peasant majority have grown hungrier and more numerous as the economic surpluses they have created are expropriated by the minority of dominant land-owning classes, landlords and usurers. Much of the Nepalese peasantry rent small allotments of land from which they eek a bare subsistence. The majority cannot accrue capital, yet they are heavily taxed and are often forced to borrow from moneylenders to sustain their existence as small farmers.<sup>14</sup>

Although the limited production of cash crops of sugarcane, tobacco, potatoes and oilseeds has occurred, the old order of lord and peasant prevails. Rice is the major food crop upon which most peasants are dependent. Under the Panchayat system, fertilisers, insecticides and seeds of high-yielding varieties, and increasing irrigation were slowly introduced. Nepal's agricultural sector remains largely pre-capitalist. It is not mechanised or diversified, and can barely sustain Nepal's rural population in work or food. The absence of a commercial revolution by the landed upper class in Nepalese agriculture was a reflection of the failure of Nepalese society to modernise in any fundamental way. Modernisation bypassed Nepal.<sup>15</sup>

The People's War was sparked not by forces representing the peasantry, but by disaffected politicised educated urban revolutionaries. Since the early 1950s political parties, both legal and illegal, have struggled for democracy in Nepal. Their efforts from this period until January 1990 were stifled or suborned by the monarch who wielded absolute political power and authority.<sup>16</sup> Between 1963 and 1990, the Panchayat system prevailed, under which the King exercised sole control in a non-party system of communal councils. The leading political organisation, the Nepali Congress Party, sought to liberalise Nepali society through the democratic process. Until 1980, the Nepali Congress Party advocated the implementation of parliamentary democracy, the end of feudalism, the nationalisation of basic industries, and progressive taxes on land, housing, profits and investments.

Although a clandestine organisation in its formative years, which had advocated the ousting of the monarchy, the Nepali Congress Party over a period of forty ineffectual years sought to achieve a programme of gradual change through parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. By the mid-1980s, the Nepali Congress Party pressed not only for the eventual democratisation of Nepalese society, but also the establishment of a market economy, and the privatisation of land, healthcare and education.<sup>17</sup> The smaller Communist Party of Nepal established amongst the Nepali diaspora in Calcutta, India, and aligning itself with the Soviet Union, advocated a programme of radical social change. Unlike the Nepali Congress Party, Nepalese communism gained few adherents in the country's agrarian districts. From its formative years, the Nepalese Communist Party experienced ideological fracturing. It was a Communist Party of intellectuals devoted to theorising rather than mass activism.<sup>18</sup>

After the Sino-Soviet Split in the early 1960s, several factions broke away from the Nepalese Communist Party to establish separate Marxist-Leninist parties inspired by the Chinese revolution. These miniscule Maoist parties gained a certain audience in the few tertiary institutions of Nepal as its education system was opened to an aspiring generation of the urban bourgeoisie. It was amongst these radicalised university students and those in India that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was to find its leaders and earliest adherents.<sup>19</sup> In 1985, the Nepali Congress Party moved towards an active non-violent opposition to the Panchayat system. They united with communists in Kathmandu and Nepal's other large cities and carried out a mass civil disobedience campaign for the establishment of a multi-party parliamentary system. A general strike spearheaded this campaign which ended in over one thousand arrested and eight people killed by bomb explosions. The mass pressure from below for reform simmered. The thirty-year reign of the Panchayat system had failed to raise living standards, while a small number of Nepalis had amassed fortunes from the corruption of massive foreign aid.

In March 1989, a trade and transport dispute between Nepal and India led to a border blockade by Delhi on the expiry of the 1978 Trade and Transit Treaty which worsened economic conditions throughout Nepal. Supplies of kerosene, petrol and diesel were immediately rationed, before drying up. Within days, sugar could not be purchased. Merchants demanded high prices for vanishing stocks of Indian goods. King Birendra was blamed by India for provoking the blockade through his purchase of a nominal supply of small arms from China. To demonstrate its power over a dependent Nepal, India revoked the Trade and Transit Treaty before renewing it within two months.<sup>20</sup>

A growing economic and political crisis emerged. Huge pro-democracy demonstrations in 1990 co-ordinated by the Nepali Congress Party and communist organisations in the cities of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur forced the King, Birendra, to concede a constitutional democracy. It ushered in Nepal's first democratically elected government since 1960. Whilst it animated the educated urban minority in electoralism, the peasantry remained politically inert and bereft of representation. The short life of parliamentary democracy in Nepal, for the select few, was underwritten and always overwhelmed by the power and authority of the monarch. The King, representative of the dominant social class, granted the existence of parliament and parliamentary parties, which replaced the system of communal rule without representation that had been sponsored by the monarch from the 1960s.

The majority of the parties elected to the Nepali parliament were of the Left. They formed loose coalition governments dominated by the Indian-influenced Nepali Congress Party. These parties which formed ever-changing governments lacked any authority. Corruption was a hallmark of their in-fighting, indecision and political impotency. The Royal House ruled. There was no significant re-distribution of land, no large-scale economic investment, and no improvement in social infrastructure. Nepalese democracy proved to be the willing marionette of the Royal House. One of the smallest left-wing factions, which had played a part in this parliamentary farce, was the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), whose cadre were largely Indian university-educated intellectuals and of the Brahmanic caste.<sup>21</sup>

Their disillusion in parliamentarism, which had failed to bring about any reform of Nepali society, led them to vacate Kathmandu for the countryside. They began to build a revolutionary base amongst the poorest peasantry in Rolpa, the most backward province of Nepal. They declared the beginning of a People's War on 13 February 1996. A Forty Point Plan was issued by the Maoists demanding an end to the monarchy and India's economic exploitation and depletion of Nepal's water resources, the establishment of a democratic secular republic, the elimination of racial, caste and gender-based oppression, local autonomy for indigenous groups, inheritance rights for women, and free popular education and

healthcare. Many of the Maoists' demands echoed the unfulfilled promises of Nepal's 1990 constitution. Its most radical demand was the abolition of the monarchy.<sup>22</sup> They sought, in Mao's words, to achieve political power out of the barrel of a gun. As Eric R. Wolf has concluded,

In Russia, China and Viet Nam... it was the political parties of middle class revolutionaries who engineered the seizure of power and created the social and military instruments which conquered the state, and ensured a transition to a new social order.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the significant historic differences, these were the tasks the Maoists of Nepal were determined to emulate. The Maoists saw a revolutionary potential among Nepal's rural poor. Whether this potential became politically effective, as Barrington Moore Jr argues:

depends on the possibility of a fusion between peasant grievances and those of other strata. By themselves the peasants have never been able to accomplish a revolution... The peasants have to have leaders from other classes. But leadership alone is not enough. Medieval and late medieval peasant revolts were led by aristocrats or townsmen and still were crushed. This point should serve as a salutary reminder to those modern determinists, by no means all Marxists, who feel that once the peasants have become stirred up, big changes are necessarily on the way.<sup>24</sup>

The origins of the present crisis in Nepal might superficially be seen in that country's development of a fully functioning bourgeois democracy. Such a view overlooks the fundamental contradictions within Nepal's economy, polity and social order. These were the determinants which have driven the People's war in Nepal for the past ten years.

### **A War of Position**

In the first stages of the Maoist people's war, the objectives were to unite with the peasantry, to take up arms against the landlord class, and to establish red base areas. This phase of the war represented what Eric Hobsbawm described as 'social banditry'.<sup>25</sup> The most powerful landlords in the poorest provinces who terrorised the peasantry were attacked by roving guerrilla bands, as were isolated police posts, agricultural banks, monarchist distilleries, and Kathmandu's Pepsi Cola plant. These targets symbolically and materially represented the forces of class oppression, especially the agricultural banks, where all paperwork that related to peasant loans was burnt. The Maoists attempted to exact a rough justice against the wealthy. Their social banditry consolidated the red base areas in the poorest and remotest provinces where the Royal State could no longer enforce its authority.<sup>26</sup> Their raids on vulnerable and isolated police posts allowed them to gradually amass a supply of weapons and ammunition. Social banditry in the Maoist-controlled districts allowed them to expand their territorial reach. Maoist people's governments composed of the most oppressed castes were established. In some districts, land was put under communal control and collectively worked. When the monarchy refused a periodic Maoist demand for a secular government, the Maoists forced the closure of schools, roads and businesses in districts under their increasing control.<sup>27</sup>

In the newly-liberated area of Pahar (the Hill Region), where small landholdings predominated, co-operative farming was encouraged. In the Terai region, the large estates of feudal lords were confiscated and re-distributed among the poorest peasants. Fertile land owned by moneylenders and public land secured by corrupt state officials were converted into model farms where new varieties of vegetables and grain were harvested by formerly landless peasant families. Small-scale irrigation, dams, and roads have been built by peasant work teams at Thawang village in Rolpa, where frequent flooding caused by tree-felling occurred. A forest defence force, with the villagers, has begun the task of reforestation. Three peasant communes in the Rolpa and Rukum district are constantly threatened by military operations, while a commune at Zolwang was burnt down by the Nepalese Royal Army. Generally in the red-base areas, peasant collectives produce food, cotton, clothing, soap, candles, paper and footwear.<sup>28</sup>

The Maoists attempted in the liberated areas to end the oppression of the untouchables, bonded labour, the trafficking in human beings and other forms of extreme exploitation. Young peasant girls and women were no longer forced into arranged marriages. Men who sexually abused women, squandered money playing cards, or were drunkards were publicly humiliated. In the red base areas, the sexual abuse and exploitation of women by the wealthy and the police was ended. Children and adults were taught to read, write and count to prevent them being swindled by merchants and moneylenders. These measures provided the Maoists with an increasing degree of popular support amongst the rural poor. They became the bedrock for the Maoists to move strategically from social banditry to insurgency. A people's militia, comprising thousands of either poorly educated or illiterate peasant adolescents and children, as well as young men and women was established throughout the liberated red zones.<sup>29</sup> Led by the Maoist outsiders, the rural poor created a rag tag army to wage war against the autocratic Nepalese state. In the context of contemporary Nepal, the peasants – Marx's sacks of potatoes – had become Barrington Moore Jr's sticks of dynamite.<sup>30</sup>

From their first act of social banditry to the consolidation of their political presence in nearly three-quarters of rural Nepal from 1996 until 2001, the Maoists waged a war of position against the ruling regime in Kathmandu. Their war in the countryside found many youthful recruits. Nevertheless, peasant families were caught between the guns of the Maoist people's army and the police. Village loyalties were divided, as were peasant families.<sup>31</sup> A logic of random violence increased the blood feuds, betrayals, atrocities and deaths of the peasantry as casualties in the revolutionary war.<sup>32</sup> Nepalese and foreign anthropologists, human rights workers and the international media portray the Maoist revolution as a betrayal of the dalits, responsible for the militarization of children, and homicidal in its sadism towards the 'class enemy'.<sup>33</sup> The revolution from below, led by intellectuals of a Brahmanic

caste seemingly obsessed with the Nepalese monarchy, was turning the country upside down. All that had seemed solid melted into mountain mist. The war of position came at a terrible cost. By 2006, nearly 12,000 had been killed in the people's war, as the foundations of the 'old building' were shaken.<sup>34</sup>

### **The King's Army Enters the Fray**

On November 26, 2001, the Nepalese government declared a state of emergency. Fifty-four thousand soldiers of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) were deployed throughout the country.<sup>35</sup> The King declared that the struggle against the Maoist insurgents was part of the global 'war on terror'. With this announcement, sophisticated weaponry and other military aid from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and the People's Republic of China, as well as draconian anti-terrorism legislation, gave the Nepali state extraordinary powers of arrest and detention and its security forces operated under an unofficial policy of killing any Nepali suspected of being a Maoist activist, sympathiser, or supporter. Between 2001 and 2004, Nepal's National Human Rights Commission recorded over 2,000 extrajudicial killings, and the highest number of reported disappearances in the world. The militarization of the conflict only worsened the material existence of the peasantry throughout Nepal.<sup>36</sup>

Although the Maoists in their War of Position were able to consolidate nearly 70 per cent of the country under their nominal control, it was always threatened by the possibility of lightning military assaults. The RNA was waging a war of attrition against the rural insurgents in the name of the war on terror. As the guerrilla insurgency intensified, the existing squabbling parties in the capital were sidelined. The King's army was effectively at war with the people. Military spending doubled and spending on social development plummeted.<sup>37</sup>

In the wake of the Palace massacre, when a drugged and drunken prince murdered his father, and most of the royal family before killing himself, the legitimacy of the monarchy was at its lowest ebb.<sup>38</sup> It seemed that Nepal, in its mystification as a Hinduist state, could no longer be ruled in the old way. The new self-appointed King made the war against the Maoists his own. Parliament was arbitrarily dismissed in May 2002. The parliamentary parties' impotence as an expression of democracy was made plain. The RNA revised its war strategy against the Maoists with surveillance aircraft from Britain, Indian-built attack helicopters, and US military advisers training the troops in counterinsurgency. Air supremacy and fire-power at night were seen as the way of winning the war. Casualties in this civil war without a front line escalated.<sup>39</sup> The peasants of Nepal were caught in this war of position where both sides demanded their loyalty and suspected them of treachery.

### **A Sense of an Ending or Dynamite Defused?**

From early 2003 until the days of May 2006, the struggle in Nepal has been punctuated by ceasefires, and all-out offensives by the RNA and the Maoists.<sup>40</sup> Seemingly, Nepal can no

longer be ruled in the old way or by the politics of the gun. The war has devastated the countryside and immiserated many of the rural masses. The citadels of kingly rule remain the large urban centres in the Kathmandu Valley. The RNA has inoculated them from the revolutionary contagion of the countryside. The Maoists' war of position has not delivered victory. Whilst the revolutionary wave has begun to affect the minority urban population through the imposition of curfews, the banning of meetings, demonstrations and marches, the muzzling of the press, and the silencing of the judiciary, the red flag does not fly over the Royal Palace.

Three weeks of mobilisations occurred in Nepal during April 2006. Comprising hundreds of thousands of the urban masses in Kathmandu, the protesters demanded the abdication of the King and the restoration of democracy. The King finally agreed to reinstate parliament on 28 April 2006.<sup>41</sup> The leaders of the People's War saw acceptance of this royal decree as 'another historic mistake'. They urged the protesters to continue their struggle until elections for an assembly to write a new constitution were won. The King's compromise with the seven-party opposition alliance left the Maoists in a political vacuum. They may embrace the compromise by abandoning the armed struggle, or recommence it in a war-weary nation. In contemporary Nepal, everything has changed and nothing has been altered. The Maoists, through the People's War, stand at the gates of the Palace. Their efforts have not brought about the revolutionary transformation of Nepal but only the restoration of parliamentary democracy where the old gang of the parliamentary parties may be elected while the King remains constitutionally inviolate. Sensing an end to the old order, the high-born officer caste of the RNA stood firm, securing the position of the King. The 'Old Building' of Royal Nepal still stands. Will the dynamite of the peasant revolt be defused?

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<sup>2</sup> Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, passim.

<sup>3</sup> Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1967, p. 455.

<sup>4</sup> John Whelpton, *A History of Nepal*, Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 189-200.

<sup>5</sup> Baburam Bhattarai, 'Political Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal', p. 1, 19 August 2005, <[http://www.cpnm.org/worker/issue4/article\\_dr.baburam.htm](http://www.cpnm.org/worker/issue4/article_dr.baburam.htm)>; Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook 2002 Nepal*, 20 November 2003, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/hp.html>>

<sup>6</sup> David Seddon, *Nepal: A State of Poverty*, 5th edition, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1993, passim.

<sup>7</sup> 'Nepal at a Glance', *The World Bank*, 2 March 2005, <[http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/npl\\_aag.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/npl_aag.pdf)>

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- <sup>8</sup> Krishna Upadhynya, 'Bonded Labour in India, Pakistan and Nepal', in Christine Van der Anker (ed) *The Political Economy of New Slavery*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004, pp. 118-136.
- <sup>9</sup> Christopher Pagdin, 'Assessing Tourism Impacts in the Third World: A Nepal Case Study', *Progress in Planning*, vol. 44, part 3, April 1995, pp. 186-266.
- <sup>10</sup> David Seddon, Jagganath Ahikau and Ganesh Gurung, 'Foreign Labour Mitigation and the Remittance Economy in Nepal', *Critical Asian Studies*, 34:1, 2002, pp. 20-34.
- <sup>11</sup> *The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Caste Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal*, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, New York, 2005, pp. 6-13.
- <sup>12</sup> Whelpton, *A History of Nepal*, pp. 127-129; 'Foreign Aid in Nepal', *Panasia*, 23 October 2003, <[http://www.panasia.org.sg/nepalnet/economics/foreign\\_aid.htm](http://www.panasia.org.sg/nepalnet/economics/foreign_aid.htm)>
- <sup>13</sup> D. Raj Pandey, 'Administrative development in a semi-dependency: the experience of Nepal', *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1989, pp. 315-329.
- <sup>14</sup> Shiva Sharma, 'Land Tenure and Poverty in Nepal', *The World Bank*, 27 June 2004, <<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/dhaka/sharma.pdf>>
- <sup>15</sup> Baburam Bhattarai, *The Nature and Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal: A Marxist Analysis*, Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 75-116; Dor Bahadur Bista, *Fatalism and Development: Nepal's Struggle for Modernization*, Orient Longman, Calcutta, 1991, passim.
- <sup>16</sup> Michael Hutt (ed) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004, pp. 1-20.
- <sup>17</sup> Whelpton, *A History of Nepal*, pp. 189-200; Michael Hutt (ed) *Nepal in the Nineties: Versions of the Past, Visions of the Future*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, pp. 50-73.
- <sup>18</sup> Leo Rose, 'Communism under high atmospheric conditions: the party in Nepal', in Robert A Scalapino (ed) *The communist revolution in Asia*, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1969, pp. 363-390.
- <sup>19</sup> Sudeer Sharma, 'The Maoist Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective', in Michael Hutt (ed) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*, pp. 38-57.
- <sup>20</sup> R. Andrew Nickson, 'Democratisation and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 30, no. 3, November 1992, pp. 358-386.
- <sup>21</sup> Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, 'High Expectations, Deep Disappointment: Politics, State and Society', in Michael Hutt (ed) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*, pp. 166-190.
- <sup>22</sup> Arjun Karki and David Seddon (eds) *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives*, Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 63-91.
- <sup>23</sup> Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, p. 297.
- <sup>24</sup> Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, p. 479.
- <sup>25</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, passim.
- <sup>26</sup> B. Raman, 'Maoists' Tet-like Offensive in Nepal', South Asia Analysis Group Paper number 368, 27 November 2001, <<http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper368.html>>; R. Radhakrishna, 'Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, April 2004, <<http://www.ipcs.org>>

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<sup>27</sup> S.D. Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response*, Rupa & Co. in association with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 131-139.

<sup>28</sup> Hisila Yami, 'Peoples' Power in Nepal', *Monthly Review*, vol. 57, issue 6, November 2005, pp. 19-25.

<sup>29</sup> Parvati, 'Women's Participation in the People's War' in Arjun Karki and David Seddon (eds) *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives*, pp. 127-139; *The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Caste Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal*, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, pp. 16-19; Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, 'Ethnicity within Maoism: Questions of Magar Territorial Autonomy, Nationality and Class', in Michael Hutt (ed) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*, pp. 112-135.

<sup>30</sup> Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, p. 49; Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, p. 479.

<sup>31</sup> Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1966 to 2003*, Zed Books, London, 2004, pp. 149-158.

<sup>32</sup> 'Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War', *Human Rights Watch*, 2004, <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal/1004/index.html>>; B. Raman, 'Maoist Offensive in Nepal', South Asia Analysis Group Paper number 274, 8 July 2001, <<http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper274.html>>

<sup>33</sup> 'Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War', *Human Rights Watch*, 2004, <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal/1004/index.html>>; *The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Caste Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal*, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, pp. 16-18; Li Onesto, 'Nepal: Children in the War Zone', *Revolutionary Worker*, no. 1274, 10 April 2005, <<http://rwor.org/a/1274/nepal-children-war-zone.html>>; Li Onesto, 'Telling Lies in Kathmandu', *Revolutionary Worker*, no. 007, 26 June 2005, <<http://rwor.org/a/007/nepal.refutation-harpers-article.htm>>; 'Caught in the Middle: Mounting Violations Against Children in Nepal's Armed Conflict', *Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict*, <<http://www.watchlist.org/reports/nepal/report.20050/20.pdf>>; 'Nepal: Children caught in the conflict', *Amnesty International*, 26 July 2005, <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA310542005>>

<sup>34</sup> 'Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy', *International Crisis Group*, 15, 2005, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org>>; Yuri Prasad, 'Nepal on the Brink', *International Socialism*, no. 110, Spring 2006, pp. 20-27.

<sup>35</sup> Prakash A. Raj, *Maoists in the Land of Buddha: An Analytical Study of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, Nirala Publications, Kathmandu, 2005, pp. 171-198.

<sup>36</sup> S.D. Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response*, Rupa & Co., Kathmandu, 2004, pp. 82-101; Rajan Bhattarai, *Geopolitics of Nepal and International Responses to Conflict Resolution*, Friends For Peace, Kathmandu, 2005, pp. 20-31; 'Human Rights Features, Nepal's TADA – Tool of terror', *Countercurrents*, 21 January 2004, <<http://www.countercurrents.org/hr-hrf210104.htm>>. Nepal's *Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Act 2002* enabled the RNA to carry out the arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings of hundreds of Nepalis seen to be either Maoists, or their supporters or sympathisers.

<sup>37</sup> Pratyush Chandra, 'The Royal Nepalese Army and the imperialist agency in Nepal', *Countercurrents*, 12 May 2006, <<http://www.countercurrents.org/nepal-chandra/20506.htm>>.

<sup>38</sup> Jonathon Gregson, *Blood Against the Snows: The Tragic Story of Nepal's Royal Dynasty*, Fourth Estate, London, 2002, passim; Sharmila Peres da Costa, 'Nepal: Paradise in Crisis?', unpublished BA Honours Thesis, School of Humanities, University of Western Sydney, 2003, pp. 1-20.

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<sup>39</sup> 'Armed Conflicts Report 2003: Nepal', *Project Ploughshares*,  
<<http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACRA/ACROO-Nepal.html>>

<sup>40</sup> W.A. Sunil, 'New Nepalese government seeks to defuse mass protest movement', *World Socialist Website*, 8 May 2006, <<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/may2006/nepa-m08-prn.shtml>>

<sup>41</sup> Kanak Mani Dixit, 'Nepal: the rising', *Open Democracy*, 24 April 2006,  
<<http://www.openDemocracy.net>>