

WHAT IS IN AN ELECTION? A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDONESIA'S 2004 REPRESENTATIVE ELECTIONS¹

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“What do elections do? Elections ... [have] ... multiple meanings, often simultaneously. They bestow legitimacy on those holding public office and, cumulatively, on the political system itself. They are also a process by which elites rotate among themselves access to public coffers, and a time for calling in political debts and exercising political muscle, including financial and physical force.”

What is an election supposed to do? How should we judge whether an election is successful? What does an election mean for society and politics? How are elections perceived by community leaders, the public, the voters, the parties, the candidates?

This paper uses interviews, campaign and election observations, candidate bio-data and election results from the Jepara local assembly election held as part of the 2004 Indonesian

¹ This paper was presented to the 19th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Canberra 29 June—2 July 2004. It has been peer-reviewed and appears on the Conference Proceedings website by permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

parliamentary elections to explore what those elections mean and what tell us about Indonesian democracy².

A few caveats are in order. First of all, while I think local studies often make large, complex problems easier to understand, I don't claim Jepara is a miniature version of Indonesia or that we can generalize widely from Jepara to Indonesia. Quite the contrary, I would argue that Jepara had one of the strongest civil societies, largest concentrations of successful indigenous entrepreneurs, most widely beneficial patterns of economic growth and most capable and responsive local governments of the New Order. It is precisely because of its capacity to resist authoritarian centralization that Jepara is an interesting place to look at democratic elections. If Jepara can't make democracy work then the task of democratic consolidation in Indonesia is even more challenging.

Secondly, these conclusions are tentative. I have a huge amount of unprocessed data on (2004 and earlier) Jepara village level voting patterns, candidate selection records, candidate and party leader interviews and local electoral commission and assembly candidate/member bio-data³, campaign observations, and election monitoring reports. Furthermore, I am still collecting data on party, candidate, voter and community perspectives on the election and voting results, and will compare them along with village results for the July and September presidential elections.

What are elections supposed to do?

As Kerkvliet notes elections can have multiple meanings for theorists, observers, and participants. Furthermore, those meanings can be contested, clarified, and obscured by campaigns.

Liberal democrats see election campaigns as educating voters about issues and the records of politicians and as educating politicians and their parties about the desires of the electorate. They assume voters make independent, rational and enlightened decisions based on their interests. They imagine increasingly electoral inclusiveness and nation-building as more and more under-represented sections of society gain a voice and have their interests considered by

² I would like to thank Flinders University for research funding, my diligent and observant research assistant, Achmed Uzair, for his data, ideas and humor, and the people of Jepara who have been so kind and helpful to a visiting researcher.

³ This includes income and wealth declarations.

competing political parties. More Weberian theorists see elections as devices for elites to choose leaders, rotate leadership positions. This rotation, it is argued, softens elite conflict by giving rival elites a turn at access to the public coffers.

The authors of *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia* stress other roles of elections. They note the role of elections in legitimating government and pacifying the electorate. They convince voters that they have had a chance to compete in fair elections and therefore should accept the results, try again later, and refrain from extra-parliamentary action to pursue their interests.

They also note that given the importance of patron-client relations in Southeast Asia and the infrequency of change of government by election that it is dubious to think of independent empowered voters as making decisions unswayed by 'guidance' from patrons or by vote-buying.

This paper will firstly, examine the fit of some of those assumptions and conclusions about democratic elections with the reality of Jepara in 2004. Secondly, it will look at what the election means for Jepara candidates, voters, and political public⁴. Finally, it will explore what the election tells us about the condition of Indonesian democracy. The aim is to present some tentative conclusions that can be tested by further qualitative and quantitative research.

WAS IT A FAIR, TROUBLE-FREE ELECTION?

The 2004 Election

Implementing the elections in Jepara was a considerable task. More than 700,000 voters in 14 sub districts and 194 villages had to be registered. 24 political parties were registered and 333 candidates were certified as eligible to stand. 2656 voting stations were established, some of them on isolated islands and unpaved mountain roads. Local committees had to be established, trained, paid, and supplied with the correct type and number of ballot papers. Campaign, voting, and vote counting rules had to be publicized, monitored, and enforced.

⁴ The political public is that part of the population which has the time, energy, resources and inclination to be interested in politics. See Schiller 1996.

There were some minor complaints about people being unable to vote because some ballot papers were missing, slow counting and miscounting of votes, and ‘dawn raids’ for vote-buying, but no charges of systematic violation of rules or intimidation of voters. As the head of the largest party (PPP) put it “Although there were shortcomings, we accept the election results.”⁵ PAN leaders worried that the new rules established small voting stations (maximum 300 voters) which increased the capacity of vote buyers to monitor compliance. They also complained that the move to a proportional district electoral system benefited large parties⁶.

The implementation of the election was credible for a number of reasons:

1. The 1999 election had embarrassed Jepara’s officials and civic leaders⁷. Four people were killed and many injured in pre-election violence in Dongos and it was widely believed that the PPP *satgas* (‘militia’?) had intimidated voters in many villages⁸. Both the local government and the PPP leadership were determined to prevent violence in 2004.⁹ The Bupati reportedly told his deputy that he was afraid that they had “put the brake on too hard.¹⁰” They had cracked down on gangs (*preman*) and party militias¹¹.
2. The *Bupati* and deputy *Bupati* did not support a political party in the election. There were more reported irregularities and considerably more tension in districts like Demak where the Bupati and some state and village officials reportedly sided with one of the parties.
3. The district Election Commission (KPU) and Election Oversight Committee (PANWASLU) were chosen in a transparent process which involved community and NGO leaders. The people chosen were considered unbiased and capable. They enforced

⁵ *Walau ada kekurangan, kami menerima hasil Pemilu. Suara Merdeka* 17 April 2004.

⁶ True, in theory, but small parties increased their share of Jepara’s elected DPR-D seats from 5% in 1999 to 18% in 2004.

⁷ In 1999 national media talked about places with outbreaks of mass violence as being ‘Jepara-ised’ (*‘dijeparakan’*).

⁸ It was widely said that “PPP won using the old ways” meaning the New Order Golkar ways.

⁹ PPP lost the district head (*bupati*) election in 2002 despite winning 18 of 40 elected seats in the 1999 election. PDI-P was second with eight. Some leaders attribute this loss to PPP alienation of the other parties because of intimidation.

¹⁰ *Rem terlalu pakem.*

¹¹ Party *Satgas* (Satuan tugas or ‘task forces’) are uniformed party youth groups often providing security for party activities and sometimes intimidating supporters of other parties.

the rules firmly and impartially. For example, PAN was fined for starting campaigning before the official campaign start. senior PPP (and other) assembly candidates were disqualified for submitting false degrees with their applications, and the popular, former President Abdurrahman Wahid—was prevented from delivering a speech to a campaign rally because he arrived after the 4.30 deadline¹².

4. The election rules limited campaigning dates and hours and the Election Commission located campaign rallies in large fields far from the centre of town and far from each other. They also stopped mobilizing masses from one election district (usually 2 or 3 sub-districts) to attend rallies in another and prohibited traffic-blocking processions on main roads. The impact of all this (and perhaps of voter disenchantment with the parties) was to greatly reduce voter participation and enthusiasm at rallies. It also reduced the opportunity for confrontation and violence.

Rotation of Elites

Did the election provide an opportunity to rotate access to power and to public coffers? Firstly, it might be useful to describe the attractions of public office—of being in Jepara's assembly (*dewan*). Secondly, I will describe the candidate selection process. Thirdly, I will mention the 'social' and financial costs of winning and holding office. Finally I will provide some preliminary findings about the changing composition of the assembly.

Attractions of Office

The financial attractions of election to the local assembly are high. Take home salary for representatives is about 7 million rupiah (A\$ 1000) per month¹³. This seven million rupiah monthly salary is almost 40 times the average per capita monthly expenditure or more than 20 times the per capita monthly GDRP. Only 6% of Jeparans consume more than 300,000 rupiah per month¹⁴. In addition, assembly members have opportunities to win leadership positions in

¹² He was allowed to say a prayer.

¹³ Some assembly members said that their salary was only five million rupiah per month but most said about seven. This includes basic salary and various allowances [*tunjangan*].

¹⁴ Badan Pusat Statistik Jepara *Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten Jepara 2002 [2002 Jepara District Gross Regional Domestic Product]* 2003, p 19 and Bappeda Jepara dan Badan Pusat Statistik Jepara *Pemerataan Pendapatan Kabupaten Jepara 2002[2002 Jepara District Distribution of Income]* 2003, p 30.

party groups (*fraksi*), commissions or chairman and deputy chairman positions in the assembly offer other allowance payments and use of motor vehicles or housing.

There are also other perks such as ‘retirement’ benefits [*tunjangan purnabakti*] paid after each term of office (5 years) to all members—whether or not they are re-elected—which are allegedly as high as 100 million rupiah (A\$15,000). Travel within Indonesia and overseas is common. After considerable public protest, the 2003 study tour involving most representatives and some state officials, NGO leaders and journalists—allegedly to study agriculture in Japan—was scaled back to a more justifiable trip to Malaysia to market Jepara furniture.

To these legal sources of income we need to add the quasi-legal and illegal payments that assembly members are believed to receive. These include payments for electing a district head (*bupati*), approving his annual accountability report or passing the budget or other legislation. In other districts it has been reported that representatives are bribed not to report fraud or mismanagement by state officials and enterprises and paid for legislation favouring special interests¹⁵.

Running for Office

Not surprisingly there are hurdles to overcome on the way to this potential goldmine. Firstly, you have to pass the scrutiny of the election commission. Secondly, you have to be nominated for a winnable position and thirdly, you have to be elected.

Selecting Candidates

11 candidates were deselected after failing to meet KPU candidate requirements. Several were disqualified for producing fraudulent diplomas including a PPP candidate who had served for years in the assembly¹⁶

¹⁵ Having said that, there are also idealistic candidates who campaign for reform. Most of them do not get nominated for winnable positions.

¹⁶ The requirement for a senior high school diploma seems unnecessary. The assembly representatives disqualified seem at least as competent as many of those elected.

To be nominated you have to win party approval for placement on a candidate list. Jeparu was divided into 5 election districts (*dapel*) with an average of 9 seats elected from each. Voters voted for a party symbol. The candidates were ranked by the party and for each quota (or biggest remainder) of votes received, the party's first, then second, etc choice would win office¹⁷. Alternatively, it was possible to vote for a candidate (as well as a party) and if a candidate's vote was greater than this quota they would be elected ahead of the party's first choice. No candidate received more than half the quota.

Each of the major political parties had their own system for selecting and ranking candidates. Some had scientific looking ranking systems that included psychological assessments, IQ tests, and scoring systems that assigned points for various categories of contributions to party organization, public appearance, etc. Others had procedures for inclusion of sub-branch (sub-district/*kecamatan*) and branch (district/*kabupaten*) party officials as candidates or as nominators for winnable positions (*urutan jadi*).

With so much at stake, the nomination process was hotly contested. One party secretary contended that the conflict within parties was greater than the conflict between parties. In practice, the procedure was far from transparent in all the major parties. In PKB a newly installed district executive threw out all its sitting candidates and then became embroiled in a dispute with the sub-branches over nominations¹⁸. PPP's leader was said to alienate PPP loyalists by giving a sure seat to an unpopular woman candidate from outside the election district. Golkar, PDIP, and Partai Demokrat had less public but similar disputes.

Winning Office

So how did candidates gain a winnable position on the candidate list and go on to win office?

¹⁷ If, for example, an election district had ten seats then the quota to win a seat was 10% of the votes. So if a party got 20% of the vote they would win two seats which would be awarded to the candidates ranked first and second on the party list. If, however the third candidate on the party list got 10% or more of the votes he or she would be elected instead of the number two candidate.

¹⁸ This involved sub-branches threatening to return their official stamp (*stempel*) as a sign of withdrawal of support and public demonstrations against the party leadership by Forpem ().

Patron-client and kinship ties were important in gaining winning positions on the candidate list. Many candidates had relatives, bosses or close friends who were party officials. Money mattered too. Parties collected campaign contributions from candidates as well as promises of a portion (usually 20-25%) of their assembly salaries. PKB required 40 million rupiah from its first and second ranked candidates. Other parties charged top ranked candidates between five and 40 million for a position likely to win. These are official payments. I could not confirm whether there were unreported payouts.

Candidates' payments to parties did not stop with selection. They also were expected to support campaign rallies by paying for transport for crowds, snacks, door prizes, and entertainment. Candidates who did not provide funds were not permitted to speak at party rallies.

'Volley Ball Politics'

'Volley ball politics'—offering villagers volley balls and nets for their votes—has become a Jepara term for 'money politics.'¹⁹ It refers to payments to villagers, youth groups and village leaders to win their support. It includes payments made during campaigns and after winning office. Candidates interviewed complained of villagers demanding drums of asphalt for roads, money for mosques, funding for village and for family ceremonies and celebrations²⁰.

Because all candidates on the party list could theoretically be elected if they got a quota of votes, campaign spending increased. Candidates who were not first or second on the list spent a great deal of money on party t-shirts, on providing refreshments for voters, and on stickers and flyers urging voters to vote for them.

All the winning candidates interviewed and some of the losers admitted spending between 70 and 200 million rupiah on the campaign. One party leader said his party had a superior strategy for trawling for voters. "I used my credit network" he said. He offered interest-free loans at religious lectures (*pengajian*), arranged for credit from his cooperative or larger loans from banks for patrons who could deliver at least 20 solid supporters in a village.

¹⁹ Volley ball is very popular in Jepara.

²⁰ PDIP and PAN candidates suggested that these 'social costs' almost outweighed the fruits of office. One PDIP representative said that often he was reluctant to go home because every afternoon there was a group of people waiting to ask for contributions.

The parties were also big spenders. According to several sources PPP spent 1.2 billion rupiah on the campaign and PDIP 600 million. The other two large parties (Golkar and PKB) probably spent similar amounts. It seems likely that the total party and candidate expenditures exceeded 10 billion rupiah (\$A 2,000,000)

In the New Order period (1966-1998) elections were often marked by a ‘dawn offensive’ (*serangan fajar*) in which substantial amounts of money were paid to patrons and voters to vote for the government party, Golkar. When questioned, one successful candidate said he was not worried about last minute vote buying because he was sure that all the candidates and parties had spent all the money they could raise.

The impact of volley ball politics will be discussed later

Elite Rotation and Inclusion

One assumption about democratic elections is that they provide an opportunity for elites to alternate access to power and state resources. Another is that democratic elections provide opportunities for including previously excluded social groups in agenda setting and decision-making. Did the Jepara election do this?

As table one shows one-sixth of the electorate used the opportunity to vote for new parties. The vote for the three largest parties fell from 82% to 62%. The vote of the largest party (PPP) fell from 44% to 32%.

TABLE ONE
1999 AND 2004
JEPARA LOCAL ASSEMBLY (DPRD) ELECTIONS
VOTE PERCENTAGES COMPARED

PARTY	1999	2004	CHANGE
PPP	44.2%	31.5%	- 12.7%
PKB	17.8%	15.8%	- 2.0%
PDIP	19.6%	14.8%	- 4.8%
GOLKAR	8.2%	11.0%	+ 2.8%
PAN	3.8%	4.3%	+ 0.5%
NEW PARTIES	6.4%	22.6%	+ 16.2%

Source: KPUD Jepara

TABLE TWO
1999 AND 2004 JEPARA LOCAL ASSEMBLY (DPRD)
PARTY COMPOSITION

PARTY	1999	2004
PPP	18	14
PKB	7	9
PDIP	8	8
GOLKAR	4	6
PAN	2	1
PBB	1	0
PKS	0	1
P. DEMOKRAT	-	4
PDKB	-	1
PDS	-	1
TNI/POLRI	5*	-

Source: KPUD Jepara

* = appointed

- = did not stand

As table two shows this resulted in four new parties gaining assembly seats. It is important that 20 of the 45 elected representatives were new to the assembly. So there was significant change both within and between parties. Also it should be noted that the new parties elected representatives include the assembly's only Christian (PDS), a radical Muslim teacher (PKS), and four representatives from a nationalist, secular background (Partai Demokrat).

This view of an increasingly inclusive local assembly can be more nuanced if we compare socio-economic and occupational data of 1999 and 2004 assembly members. See tables three and four.

TABLE THREE
1999 JEPARA ASSEMBLY REPRESENTATIVES
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA²¹

AGE:	<40	40-60	60+	
	10	29	1	
GENDER:	MALE	FEMALE		
	38	2		
BIRTHPLACE:	JEPARA	NOT JEPARA		
	32	8		
RESIDENCE:	URBAN	RURAL		
	10	30		
ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION:	NU	MUHAMMADIYAH	OTHER	
	29	2	2	
EDUCATION:	>HIGH SCHOOL	S1+	S2+	
	29	11	2	
INCOME:	<Rp300,000 MONTHLY	RP 300,000+ MONTHLY	1,000,000+	
	0	12	22	
WEALTH:	<1,000,000	RP 1-10 MILLION	10-100 MILLION	>100 MILLION
	0	0	5	7
OCCUPATION:	SELF-EMPLOYED	TEACHER	STATE OR VILLAGE OFFICIAL	
	14	18	4	
SECTOR:	FURNITURE	CONTRACTOR	TRADER	
	0	0	3	

²¹ Data is from candidates' statements filed with the KPU Jepara (Jepara Election Commission Office) and supplied by the KPU and/or Jepara political party headquarters. Not all of the information requested was supplied. 1999 data was also supplied by the Secretariat of the Jepara District Peoples' Representative Assembly.

TABLE FOUR
2004 JEPARA LOCAL ASSEMBLY (DPRD)
REPRESENTATIVES SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA²²

AGE:	<40	40-60	60+	
	12	22	1	
GENDER:	MALE	FEMALE		
	42	3		
BIRTHPLACE:	JEPARA	NOT JEPARA		
	30	5		
RESIDENCE:	URBAN	RURAL		
	8	30		
ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION:	NU	MUHAMMADIYAH	OTHER	
	22	2	12	
EDUCATION:	>HIGH SCHOOL	S1+	S2+	
	10	13	2	
INCOME:	<Rp300,000 MONTHLY	RP 300,000+ MONTHLY	1,000,000+	
	3	12	21	
WEALTH:	<1,000,000	RP 1-10 MILLION	10-100 MILLION	>100 MILLION
	0	2	7	26
OCCUPATION:	SELF-EMPLOYED	TEACHER	STATE OR VILLAGE OFFICIAL	
	17	18	1	
SECTOR:	FURNITURE	CONTRACTOR	TRADER	
	2	1	7	

²² Data is from candidates' statements filed with the KPU Jepara (Jepara Election Commission Office) and supplied by the KPU and/or Jepara political party headquarters. Not all of the information requested was supplied

The gender composition of the assembly did not improve greatly. Although there were 84 women candidates only three were elected in 2004, one more than in 1999. The average age, urban-rural balance, Jepara-born vs. outsider balance, and average educational level is almost unchanged.

The 2004 assembly has three representatives whose reported monthly income is less than Rp 300,000 compared to none in 1999. 22 assembly representatives reported incomes of one million rupiah or more compared to 21 in 2004. However, the greatest change is in the wealth of the assembly members. In 1999 only 7 representatives had a declared wealth of 100 million rupiah or more. By 2004 26 representatives claimed to have assets of 100 million or more.

Both the 1999 and 2004 assemblies included 18 teachers and this was the largest group. The number describing themselves as self-employed rose from 14 in 1999 to 17 in 2004 and those who came from backgrounds as state officials shrank from four to one. Two representatives had furniture businesses in 2004 while seven said they were traders and one a contractor. There were no contractors or furniture entrepreneurs in the 1999 assembly.

One interesting change is in the organizational background of representatives. The number coming from NU and Muhammadiyah or affiliated organisations was as expected, 29 in 1999 and 22 in 2004 for NU, and two in both elections for Muhammadiyah. However, the number with organizational experience outside those organizations increased from two in 1999 to twelve in 2004.

Overall then, we have a picture of moderate elite competition for public office and some inclusion of new groups in the local political elite. The party composition in the assembly has changed some. However, elites are by definition minorities and the wealth difference between elected representatives and most Jeparans—whose 2003 average incomes were about Rp 300,000 per month—and the bulk of local representatives whose income is 20 to 30 times that seems to be widening.

Campaigns and Voter Choice

Finally, I want to discuss the campaign to see whether it attempted to enlighten local voters and to see what it suggests about how voters made their voting decisions. I want to

explore three questions. How do parties and candidates attempt to attract voters? Are local issues important? On what basis do voters decide?

Public Campaigns

Political party public campaigns in Jepara did not seem very effective. Most of the effort in rallies was to mobilize supporters and whoever else could be enticed by door prizes, petrol money, free drinks and food, entertainment or celebrity appearance to attend rallies. Once gathered the crowd was offered dance music (*dangdut*), speeches, and sometimes, prayers.

In 2004 the places provided by the electoral commission for rallies were very large. Even the largest rallies did not fill the provided fields so the thin crowds were not so exuberant. Political parties also were not allowed to block traffic or take motorcades through opposition strongholds. Generally party leaders complained to me that there was none of the enthusiasm and voluntary contributions of 1999. In 2004 people needed to be paid for everything.

Rally speeches were not about party policies or local issues. PDIP said that Suharto had left a huge debt and Mega was taxing the rich to pay that debt. PPP recalled its glory days fighting against the New Order and asked voters to remember the repression. Golkar talked about the breakdown of law and order and said it would end lawlessness and restore development. PKB said it was the party of NU and Gus Dur. Only PKS discussed what it would do to end corruption and for local development.

It is hard to believe that these utterances to the faithful—and the paid attendees—had as much impact on voter choice as the ‘volley ball politics’ or the media. It seems much more likely that identity politics—seeing your vote as confirming your identity as NU or Muhammadiyah or nominal Muslim or Christian—in combination with a money politics-primed patron client system that delivered most of the votes.

Local issues mattered, but it wasn’t who could stop the forest looting which is threatening to devastate Jepara’s crucial furniture industry or who could protect the coastal and marine environment that might offer future economic growth and employment. Instead, it was about disappointed patrons who did not gain nomination to a winning spot on the candidate list.

Disqualification of a senior PPP leader for using a false diploma was said to cost PPP seats because his supporters stayed home.

Is there growing voter autonomy²³? If voter autonomy means capacity to make informed choice in your own interest, I think there is evidence in the 2004 Jeparu election that voter autonomy is growing. It lies primarily within the patron-client system and Jeparu's successful industrialization. That industrialization has produced wealth and many sources of patronage. It also has widened access to media and education which tend to support economic and political autonomy.

Explaining voter choice will be my next research task. I can only provide sketchy evidence for autonomy here. One bit of evidence is that the winning party got more than 50% of the vote in less than 10% of Jeparu's 194 villages. In a majority of villages the difference between first and second placed parties was less than 20%. Jeparu has four parties with between 11 and 32% of the vote. Such competition coupled with Jeparu's low level of poverty should tend to offer more freedom for voter choice.

The evidence of movement to new parties in 2004 suggests that for 23% of voters—up from six percent in 1999 old identities are weakening or being redefined. Another sign of decline in identity politics was the 75,000 vote increase in non-Islamic party votes and the 45,000 vote decrease in Islamic party votes between 99 and 04.

Was the Election Successful?

“Elections ... provide an opportunity to debate and contemplate issues, including the meaning and purpose of elections themselves. And they are struggles to give substance to ... democracy.”

Kerkvliet in Taylor, p, 163.

*What is the difference between 1999 and this [2004] election? In 1999 we chose a cat in a bag.
But in this election we are directly choosing crooks!*

²³ It might be possible to detect and map degrees of voter autonomy based on distributions of education, wealth, relative isolation and other variables compared to political competitiveness and vote movement in more than one election at the village level. I will try to do that for Jeparu.

How you answer that question depends on what elections are supposed to achieve. Idealistic reformist friends in PKB and NU and PMII students whose banner is quoted above were disappointed because the role of money politics was great and these payments and patrimonial ties influenced the outcome.

They see the money politics and cronyism as a fatal flaw and they may be right²⁴. But I see the election as performing many democratic functions successfully:

1. It demonstrated Jepara's capacity to hold a peaceful, fair election. This is important in establishing social trust after the decades of repression, violence and rigged elections of the New Order. It is all the more important in Jepara because foreigners have to feel safe working there and visiting there to buy furniture.
2. It offered an opportunity for voters to punish Jepara's big four parties that dominated the 1999 assembly and district government for perceived incompetence or inaction...
3. It slightly increased the representation of women and brought radical Islam (PKS) nominal Muslims (Partai Demokrat) and a member of the Christian minority into the political arena. The increase in votes for small and new parties may give hope to others that the ballot box is the best way for political action.
4. It also seems to offer voters the chance to identify themselves as NU or Muhammadiyah but see a range of parties that might be worth supporting. This multiple identity as NU and Partai Demokrat or Muhammadiyah and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is good for social cohesion and integration.
5. Finally, the election ended—as it had in 1999—with the PKB leader saying we respect that PPP is the largest party and should have a central role in the assembly leadership. He went on to say that PKB did well to win nine seats and the important thing is NU is strong in most parties and Jepara is calm.

²⁴ If every local election involved campaign spending of A\$2,000,000 then Indonesia's parties and candidates would nearly A\$800,000,000 on money politics at the local level. And of course there are debts to be repaid to those who provide the money.

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