

***‘Spirituality’ vs ‘Religion’ Indonesian Style:  
Framing and Re-framing Experiential Religiosity in Contemporary  
Indonesian Islam***

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This paper reflects on the increased saliency in Indonesia since the 1990s of a family of terms related to and cognate with the English language term ‘spirituality’. More particularly, it reflects on the partial displacement of Indonesian language terms associated with the word ‘kebatinan’ (I., lit. ‘inwardness,’ and more broadly ‘spirituality’) by the English term ‘spirituality’ and its cognates and examines the social dynamics associated with this change. I argue that the new usages of ‘spiritual,’ ‘spirituality,’ ‘spirituil’ (I.), ‘spiritualitas’ (I.) etc. signal and facilitate the erosion of the legal and administrative construction of religious life in Indonesia that reached its heights in the 1970s and 1980s under the New Order’s deployment of the Panca Sila philosophy as an ideological tool.

The paper begins with a brief history of changes in the legal status of *kebatinan* in Indonesia that culminated in the 1970s in the denial of its standing as ‘religion’ (*agama*) but acceptance as an expression of the constitutionally required ‘belief in One High God’ (*KeTuhanan Yang Maha Esa*). Under that formula, *kebatinan*, reglossed as ‘*kepercayaan*’ (‘a faith’), became a theoretically ‘separate but equal’ expression of the kind of belief required of good citizens. The paper then documents changes in the administration of the *kepercayaan* groups since 1999 (in the ‘Reformasi’ or post-New Order period) and the associated burgeoning of ‘spiritual’ groups, activities and products operating free from any official designation or surveillance as either a ‘religion’ (*agama*) or ‘faith’ (*kepercayaan*).

The paper also reflects on the role of the urban Sufi revival in popularizing concepts associated with the word ‘spiritualitas.’ The revival is based in the broader Islamic revival of the last thirty years but nourished by the increasingly cosmopolitan life-worlds of the middle and upper-classes and by their growing engagement with the rapidly globalising religious market. I argue that the framing of Sufi experiential religiosity in terms of ‘spiritualitas’ or ‘spirituality’ has both helped legitimize Sufism as respectable for modern sophisticates and opened the door for conscientious Muslims to more fully appreciate other religions. Terms like ‘spiritualitas’ are now strategically deployed by defenders of full religious pluralism in Indonesia to evoke the common ground and equal value of all the recognized religions.

The identification of Sufi experiential religiosity with ‘spirituality,’ moreover, has facilitated the broad acceptance by Muslim cosmopolitans of the wide range of new ‘spiritual’ activities and product providers now operating outside the bounds of the

recognized religions and the escape of those ‘spiritual’ groups from the administrative surveillance applied to the older *kebatinan* groups.

### **Agama and Kebatinan: Changing Regimes of Governmental Definition and Control**

***Kebatinan* to 1965: The Lost Battle for Recognition as Agama.** As is widely recognized (Geertz 1960:339-352; Howell 1978; and Mulder 1998:19-20), the formation of formally constituted organisations around beliefs and practices identified with *kebatinan* is a product of twentieth century processes of modernization in religious and political organization. The concept of *kebatinan*, however, has its origins in Sufi traditions dating back to the sixteenth century in Southeast Asia (Azra 2004; Riddell 2001). Sufi expressions of Islam, which had been vigorous and widespread in Southeast Asia prior to the growth of Islamic Modernism in the twentieth century, conventionally contrasted ‘outer’ (*lahir*) and ‘inner’ (*batin*) expressions of faith. The former referred to the performance of formal ritual obligations and observance of Islamic law, while the latter (*kebatinan*) referred to interiorised ethical commitments, devotional attitudes and mystical experience.

During the first half of the twentieth century, Modernist Muslims, notably those associated with the Muhammadiyah, substantially discredited the Sufi orders (*tarekat*). They charged that the Sufis compromised the Oneness of God, harboured non-Islamic practices, and promoted anti-modern attitudes such as authoritarianism and gullibility to superstition. Some orders initiated internal reforms. Other networks of gurus and their disciples dissociated themselves from Islam or framed new inspirations without reference to an exclusive major religion. It was in this context that an opposition began to form between the notion of *kebatinan* and Islam, and *kebatinan* came increasingly to signal independent, and in some cases formally organized, groups outside the fold of Islam.

When the Indonesian constitution was framed in 1945, the main issue was whether the nation should be founded as an Islamic state, given that around ninety percent of the fledgling nation were Muslims and Islam had been one of the main banners around which diverse ethnic groups had rallied to oust the Dutch colonialists. The proposed Jakarta Charter would have required the State to enforce Islamic law (*syariah*) for Muslims. This, however, was defeated, in large part because the Muslim community itself had a variety of interpretations of Islamic law and many views on its relationship to customary law, its openness to reinterpretation by non-specialists, and its relative importance with respect to inner mystical knowing. Instead, a compromise was reached that committed Indonesian citizens to faith in One High God (*KeTuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) as expressed in the ‘Panca Sila’ doctrine of the Preamble to the Constitution. The body of the 1945 Constitution then committed the state to supporting the free practice of ‘religion and faith’ (*agama dan kepercayaan*).

It is my understanding that at the constitutional convention of 1945 ‘religion and faith’ were regarded as synonymous, even though from 1973 retrospective histories promoted by representatives of *kebatinan* groups rebadged as ‘faiths’ (*kepercayaan*) have represented ‘faith’ (*kepercayaan*) as a contrasting with ‘religion’ and distinct from it. We

return to this below. Certainly the structure of the Department of Religion in 1945 made clear (in the absence of clarifying clauses in the Constitution) that ‘religion’ referred to Indonesia’s major ‘religions of the book’: Islam and Christianity. Accordingly, most of the Department’s operations served the Muslim *ummat*, but there was a separate directorate general’s office was established for Protestantism and Catholicism.

From 1950 the Department of Religion undertook to catalogue other beliefs and practices to determine where missionising activities needed to be directed and where surveillance of deviant groups was required. Amongst the former was Balinese religion, which the provincial legislative assembly of Bali managed to save from state-sponsored missionising by winning it a place in the Ministry of Religion in 1958 (Howell 1978, 1982:513). The primary target of the latter designation, i.e., those suspected of deviance and calling religion into disrepute, were the independent *kebatinan* groups. These grew rapidly in number after Independence (cf Subagya 1976:9) and some boldly proclaimed themselves as ‘new religions’ (*agama baru*), demanding recognition and support from the national government (cf. Geertz 1960:349).<sup>1</sup> In 1954 the Department of Religion established a bureau, PAKEM (Pengawasan Aliran-aliran Kemasyarakatan), to exercise surveillance of the *kebatinan* groups. In 1960, when political tensions running along religious and other ideological lines was intensifying, PAKEM was ominously moved out of the Ministry of Religion and into the Ministry of Justice (Howell 1982:533; Mulder 1998:21).

To counter these moves, the mystical groups in 1955 formed a higher level coordinating body, the Badan Kongres Kebatnan Seluruh Indonesia or BKKI, which held several congresses in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite these efforts, however, the *kebatinan* groups were decisively segregated from ‘religion’ (*agama*) in 1965 when, just a few months before Gestapu and the ascension of Suharto’s New Order, then President Sukarno enunciated in his Pen Pres 1, 1965, the first explicit determination of what was to be considered ‘religion’ under the constitution. He did this by naming the proper Indonesian ‘religions’: Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism (named separately), Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Not only were no *kebatinan* groups on the list, but a separate paragraph advised ‘each to return to its source [in one of the recognized religions]’.

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<sup>1</sup> Twenty nine of the 516 mystical groups listed by Subagya (1976:130-138) from various government department and other registers dating from 1952 to 1972 have the word ‘agama’ (religion) in their title (e.g., Agama Buddha Jawi Wisnu Indonesia). As a composite list, however, it cannot give an accurate picture of which *kebatinan* groups, or what proportion of *kebatinan* groups, styled themselves as ‘religions’ in the 1950s. For example, the still substantial Sapta Darma group was called ‘Agama Sapta Darma’ until the fall of Sukarno’s ‘Old Order,’ but does not appear as such in Subagya’s list.

The first national association of mystical groups, the BKKI (see below), determined at its 1956 congress that *kebatinan* was not a new religion (*agama baru*). However individual groups continued to press for recognition as ‘religions’ and tried to change the BKKI’s position. The association between *kebatinan* and the idea of ‘new religions’ has remained strong in the wider society. This is evident in the language used by Subagya (1976:9) in the opening page of his survey and analysis of the *kebatinan* movement where he remarks: ‘The phenomenon of “new religion[s]” (peristiwa “agama baru”), which nowadays are usually called “Kebatinan,” has spread all over Indonesia, to all levels of society”.

***Kebatinan* in 1970s: Elevation and Pillarisation under the New Order Panca Sila Ideology.** The Suharto regime made immediate use of Sukarno's designation of 'proper' Indonesian religions, making Pen Pres 1, 1965 into law in 1969, and requiring every citizen to report to his or her local authority which of those religions they espoused. (Confucianism, however, was removed from the list of choices, because of its association with the Chinese community and hence with the arch enemy of the New Order, Communism.) A significant effect of this was to reinforce the construction of all the 'religions' as mutually exclusive creeds, consonant with a high modern disapproval of 'syncretism' (Author: forthcoming). The construction of all 'religions' (*agama*) as congregational and exclusive was also useful for exercising surveillance over religious action at a time when unorthodox, folk or lax practice was equated with 'atheism' and so, like Chinese traditions, associated with Communism. This threw into sharp relief the *kebatinan* groups, which normally drew on Christian as well as Muslim traditions, plus local autochthonous beliefs and Theosophical Society representations of the Far Eastern religions.

In 1970, however, political machinations inspired by the need to turn out overwhelming voter support for the New Order's GOLKAR party brought a sudden reversal of ill-fortune to the *kebatinan* groups. The new government actually facilitated the resuscitation of the BKKI (as the BK5I<sup>2</sup>) and the construction of a formula whereby the *kebatinan* groups, henceforth to be identified as *kepercayaan* or 'faith' groups, could be linked to the word 'faith' in the 1945 constitution in that phrase where the country was committed to protecting citizens' 'religion and faith' (Howell 1982:533-534; Mulder 1998:24; Stange 1986). A new coordinating body for the 'faiths' was formed, the Sekretariat Kerjasama antar Kepercayaan (SKK). Then in 1973, the new Guidelines for State Policy (Tap MPR 1973 II of the Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) legally recognized 'kepercayaan' groups as separate but equal expressions of the Indonesian belief in the One High God (keTuhanan yang Maha Esa). Specifically, while still not being recognized as 'religions', they were nonetheless acknowledged as legitimate forms of 'belief' (*kepercayaan*) under the 1945 Constitution (Kementrian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2003:9). Legislative Act (Ketetapan MPR) No IV/MPR/1978 reinforced this determination.

As a consequence of this legislation, the 'faiths' (that is the surviving *kebatinan* groups) were awarded a place in the Department of Education and Culture with an office of their own. A small amount of funds was allocated to document the beliefs and practices of registered groups. Theoretically citizens could acknowledge a 'faith' instead of a 'religion' on their citizen's identity card, marry according to their 'faith' and take oaths according to it as well. TV airtime on the state-run channel was provided for the 'faiths' to explain their articles of belief, as recorded by the Department. In practice, however, few people exercised such privileges without incurring grave social disadvantages, and

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<sup>2</sup> The acronym stands for 'Badan Kongres Kepercayaan Kejiwaan Kerohanian Kebatinan Indonesia.' The expanded title foregrounds 'kepercayaan' (the 'faiths') and links that concept not only with 'kebatinan' but with 'kejiwaan' and 'kerohanian.' The latter two reference 'spirit' and 'soul,' thereby generally connoting something of a monotheistic orientation and distancing those movements from suggestions of occultism and the black arts (*klenik*) from which the *kebatinan* groups suffered, however unfairly.

unpleasant associations with ‘occultism’ (*klinik*) never really wore off the re-branded *kebatinan* groups. Moreover, and ironically, the once protean *kebatinan* groups came to be articulated through the Department of Education and Culture as, in effect, mini congregational religions, each with its own dogmas.<sup>3</sup>

For a while the mystical groups were carefully supervised. And all previously unregistered religious-like groups had to be registered with the ‘faiths’ office or show that they were affiliates of a proper religion. In recent years, however, this has changed considerably.

***Kebatinan* and ‘Spirituality’ since ‘Reformasi’: Shifting Patterns of Religious Pluralism.** After New Order dictator Suharto resigned in 1998, his carefully constructed pyramid of patronage and control fell apart, opening the way for all sorts of political and religious expression to come out into the open and operate more or less freely. The first democratic elections were held, contested by an array of political parties not seen since the 1950s. As in the political sphere, so also in the religious sphere (which is in any case only partly distinct). In the absence of strict government controls, all sorts of religious groups surfaced. Even fundamentalist Muslim groups like the Front Pembela Islam and Laskar Jihad have operated openly (cf. Hefner 2003; International Crisis Group 2002; Yunanto 2003). After the Bali bombings, the Laskar Jihad was disbanded, but other jihadist groups continue to attract support. Equally, and probably more significantly, some of the smaller non-violent conservative Muslims parties made a bid (unsuccessfully) in 2002 to reinstate the provisions of the Jakarta Charter for state implementation of the *syariah* and have regrouped to attempt piece-meal implementation of Islamic law.

The Muslim religious right, in other words, is vigorous and active. However, so is the liberal end of the Muslim religious spectrum. Strong opposition to the proposed ‘Jakarta Charter’ amendments to the Constitution in 2002 testify to this, as does on-going organizing by inter-faith groups and liberal Muslims to defeat the smaller pieces of

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<sup>3</sup> Even in the 1950s Geertz (1960:349) recognized a sense in which the *kebatinan* groups represented a kind of denominationalisation of previously informal guru-student networks. The spreading use, however nominal, of the appertenances of formal voluntary organization (an organization name, articles of incorporation, the naming of office holders, etc) by *kebatinan* groups in the early post-war period certainly evidences something of a move in that direction. The larger named *kebatinan* groups like Pangestu, SUBUD, Sumarah and Sapta Darma, also had written treatises on their beliefs or pamphlets for members detailing the group’s basic beliefs and practices. The point taken here is that the New Order incorporation of mystical/‘faiths’ groups into a government body charged with assisting in their promotion intensified pressures towards denominationalism. The requirement for ‘protected’ groups to submit to the Department written formulations of their basic beliefs and describe their practices, meeting times and formats, etc., moved the smaller groups, as well as the major high-profile groups, towards the congregational pattern.

Nonetheless, under the New Order the mystical groups increasingly presented themselves as complementary to the recognized religions, rather than as alternatives to them. While some proponents of *kebatinan* zealously attempted to exercise their newly affirmed right to marry according to the rites of their ‘faith,’ and be sworn into office using their group’s own invocations, etc., most groups acknowledged that this was politically impractical and accepted that members would utilize an affiliation with an acknowledged ‘religion’ for such purposes.

proposed *syariah*-inspired legislation (e.g., on punishing religiously unlawful sexual relations and further restricting interfaith marriage). Moreover, Abdurrahman Wahid, during his presidency, demonstrated strong contrition on behalf of elements of the Muslim community for their post-Gestapu persecution of Communists and Chinese Indonesians, lifting many restrictions on Chinese cultural expression and reinstating 'Agama Khonghucu' ('The Confucian Religion') as one of Indonesia's recognized religions.

Other changes in religion-state relationships in the Reformasi period are less widely known though ultimately perhaps no less significant. These are changes in the administration of the 'faiths' and the general deterioration of surveillance of them. These changes have permitted a substantially new array of 'spiritual' groups, activities and products to blossom and elude classification as either 'religion' or 'faith.' This new, unregulated 'spirituality' and the attitudes underlying it are blurring the boundaries of the 'religions' and the 'faiths.'

In 1999 an administrative reorganization split in two the Department of Education and Culture. The 'faith' groups were moved to a new Department of Culture and Tourism, occasioning a prolonged disruption of supervisory activities and loss of documents. Since then, according to best-selling Indonesian language 'spiritual' writer Anand Krishna,<sup>4</sup> whose multi-faith Ashram overruns bureaucratic boundaries, the 'faiths' bureau has remained disorganized, paying little attention to which groups are doing what. Exponents of other independent and self-styled 'spiritual' groups I questioned about registering as a 'faith' group said simply that it was no longer necessary. Since Reformasi, they said, nobody cares anymore. Certainly the 'faiths' office has a more restricted brief now than in previous years and a substantially reduced budget.<sup>5</sup> It could also be said that dissociation of the mystical groups from a ministry supervising education and culture and their relegation to a ministry of culture and tourism has symbolically downgraded them: 'culture' may suggest the value of national heritage, but when associated with tourism it seems to connote sentimentally commemorated 'traditions' no longer really valuable in the modern world except as items on nostalgic display.<sup>6</sup>

The burgeoning spiritual marketplace in Indonesia's major cities now includes books, tapes, and workshops featuring the leading 'spiritual' authors and self-improvement authorities that can be found in any large Western city. Popular books range from

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<sup>4</sup> Interview, Jakarta, March 2003.

<sup>5</sup> According to personnel in the new 'faith's' office, their present brief is merely to 'assist' the 'faiths' groups as needed, not to promote or control them. In contrast to the late 1970s, there is no budget for programming on the state television channel or for the publication of information brochures about the individual groups that could be distributed to the public. (Source: personal interview, Jakarta 2003.) The office has, however, recently published an overview of the legislative and administrative history of the 'faiths' and a table of data on the individual groups (see Kementrian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2003).

<sup>6</sup> Newland (2001:9) raises the possibility of a similar discursive strategy on the part of the state health bureaucracy. Clinic personnel have attempted to link West Javanese birth rituals, seen as properly 'Islamic' by Nadhlatul Ulama-oriented villagers, with 'archaic survivals of the Hindu past.' Suggestions that the rituals are syncretic (an association that also clings to *kebatinan*) links them with 'quaint' traditions putatively superseded by modern normative religious practice.

'classics' like Victor Frankl's books on Logotherapy and Khalil Gibran's poetic spiritual reflections to Lama Surya Das's *Awakening to the Sacred*, Sandy MacGregor's *Peace of Mind*, William Lee Rand's books on Reiki and James Redfield's *Celestine Prophecy*. This literature does not recognize the boundaries drawn around 'religions' and 'faiths' by Indonesian legislation. It even blurs boundaries between 'the spiritual' and science in the many popular self-improvement programs for physical and mental health (such as numerous stress-relief regimes using yoga and meditation) and for better performance in school and work. Concepts like 'Emotional Intelligence,' 'Spiritual Intelligence,' and various management training regimes grounded in 'spiritual' ideas like those in Gay Hendrik's *Corporate Mystic* (widely available locally) are all popular in major Indonesian cities. Undoubtedly the leading brand in spiritualised self-help and management training is 'Manajemen Qolbu' (or Heart Management) launched by Indonesia's stellar mass-media Muslim preacher, Abdullah Gymnastiar.

The fading surveillance of the boundaries of 'religions' and 'faiths' is attributable not only to official downgrading and neglect of the *kepercayaan* office. It can also be seen as a consequence of changes in patterns of personal religiosity and self-cultivation occasioned by the rapid expansion of Indonesia's middle classes under the Suharto government and the growing engagement of educated elites with global networks of information. The expansion of those classes and changes in their patterns of religiosity are in turn attributable in great part to the extension of formal education in the Suharto years, from the late 1960s to the 1990s, when improved standards of education were identified as one of the social foundations of the New Order economic development programs.

Those in the growing middle classes who enjoyed access to secondary and tertiary education acquired a modest to high level of training in rational-critical thought and were able to move into the modern sector of the economy where such cognitive strategies were required. Even children from strict Muslim families using the traditional religious schools (*pesantren*) increasingly received some secular education in the new, mixed curriculum schools. The expansion and upgrading of the Muslim tertiary institutes, the IAIN, also made it possible for substantial numbers of strict Muslims to supplement the scholasticism of their early schooling with historical-critical and social science studies and join in a shared scholarly ethos with the wider educated Indonesian public. Such advanced Muslim scholars have formed a new brand of Muslim religious leader capable of addressing the interests of a more enquiring and intellectually autonomous Muslim public. This new breed of Muslim teacher now reaches the educated middle and upper classes through greatly expanded Muslim book sales, television and radio programming, videos and DVS, and the more up-market guided haj tours. They also staff the commercial adult Islamic education institutes like Yayasan Paramadina and IiMan that offer university style short courses for educated Muslim elites. Such students and their teachers carry into their religious lives the intellectual autonomy and critical thinking that they exercise in their everyday work and community lives (Author: forthcoming).

One of the consequences of this intellectual independence in religious matters is that many well educated Muslims, and particularly those who have participated in the adult

Islamic short courses, feel free to pursue their interests in personal development and religious understanding beyond the conventional bounds set by conservative religious authorities and the state. Thus, for example, many urban sophisticates have re-examined the opprobrium formerly attached to Sufism by Modernist Muslims. Indeed books, lectures and workshops on ‘Sufism’ have been enormously popular in the last ten to twenty years (Howell 2001). The commercial adult Islamic education institutes such as Paramadina have supported this acceptance of Sufism by offering a course on it as part of their Islamic studies programs. The appeal of Sufism in this class has often been expressed to me in terms of its emphasis on the ‘essence’ (*inti*) or deeper meaning (*makna*) of religion and how the Sufi practices help reveal that. The widespread reshaping of understandings of Islam around such qualities helps to foster a ready appreciation of people from other religious traditions for whom the outer, ritual and legal forms of their religion, however important, are not the sum total of what they cherish.

This new openness to Sufism, which is to say, to interiorized Islamic spirituality that can be developed as a path of mystical knowing, has grown along with the increasing involvement of cosmopolitan Indonesians in global networks of exchange and communication. Such involvement has drawn significant numbers of Indonesian Muslim cosmopolitans into the global spiritual marketplace, where the concept of ‘spirituality’ has gained increasing saliency and positive valence, both in popular and academic literature. In this global spiritual marketplace, ‘Sufism’ has considerable cache, but appears mostly de-coupled from a confessional context. Sufism is thus linked with ‘spirituality’ that crosses denominational boundaries in this global marketplace, and is recognizable in other faith traditions as well as non-denominational contexts. Indonesia’s Muslim elites (and the increasing numbers of middle class Muslims who use English in study and work, surf the internet and watch satellite TV) participate in this global spiritual marketplace. While some reject the relativisation of religious traditions that this cosmopolitan experience stimulates, others of a more liberal persuasion have readily embraced it and used the concept of ‘spirituality’ to affirm an interest in Sufism as part of Islam and to appreciate what are seen to be equivalent spiritualities in other religious traditions. They are also open, selectively, to wide range of spiritual products available from overseas, as well as to the domestic products in a similar ‘spiritual’ vein. All of this presents a virtually overwhelming challenge to would-be government regulators, who seem to have given up the task of surveilling Indonesia’s domestic spiritual marketplace.

### **Indonesia’s New Spiritual Marketplace**

In this environment a variety of ‘spiritual’ groups now operate in ways that challenge the old pillarised, congregational framework for ‘religion and faith’ administration, crossing the boundaries of the ‘religions’ and/or ‘faiths’ in various ways and yet operating substantially or wholly free of engagement with either the Department of Religion or the ‘faiths’ office in the Department of Culture and Tourism. These independent groups, which have not registered with the *kepercayaan* office but nonetheless promote conceptions of spirituality not strictly associated with the ‘religions,’ can be loosely characterized under three headings: 1) international organizations with domestic branches in Indonesia; 2) homegrown eclectic groups; and 3) Sufi groups (both local and affiliated

with international organizations) whose universalism challenges old administrative boundaries. The following examples will give some substance to each of these types:

*International organizations operating in Indonesia:* The best known of these groups, judging from the publicity they attract in popular magazines and the audiences attracted to their special events, are the Brahma Kumaris, The Art of Living and Reiki. The Brahma Kumaris (BKs) are a Hindu-derived group founded in India in 1937. From their beginnings in the Sindh area of what is now Pakistan they have presented themselves as a 'university' offering 'spiritual' teachings. The group became transnational and multi-ethnic in the early 1970s. Their teachings were introduced to Indonesia in 1982 by an Australian sister, Helen Quirin, through the expatriate Sindhi and Indian community in north Jakarta. She was originally obliged to register the group as 'Hindu,' despite the international organization's vigorous rejection of a Hindu identity or even any characterization as a 'religion.' However, in the mid 1990s as increasing numbers of Indonesians from Christian and Muslim backgrounds began to participate in the BKs' free meditation programs, discrete pressure was brought to bear to change over to the 'faiths' office. The group is not publicly presented as a 'faith,' nor do participants interviewed by the author associate it with *kepercayaan* or *kebatinan*. The BK sisters and brothers now running the centers regard the 'faiths' registration merely as an old formality. Sister Helen is active in inter-faith groups like MADIA and the Indonesian Council on Religion and Peace, where she and a number of Indonesian activists insert into more conventional ecumenical discussions a perennialist understanding of religion underpinned by an essentially common spirituality. The BKs also promote through their free meditation classes and public talks the notion of a spirituality that can be cultivated in settings not formally associated with one's religion.

The Art of Living (*Seni Kehidupan*) operates somewhat defensively in Indonesia as a strictly health promotion group. It eschews vocabulary like 'spiritual' development in all materials for general consumption, including in the promotion of its introductory hatha yoga course. Nonetheless, experiences of Muslim patrons of more advanced Art of Living courses suggest an element of esoteric teaching in them. Certainly the focal teacher of the organization, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, is feted like a guru when he visits Indonesia. On his last visit to Jakarta, for example, he was escorted to a dinner for a thousand guests in a major hotel driving along a street strewn with flowers and then seated, bedecked in leis, on an elevated cushion before his guests.

The Reiki groups in Indonesia offer subtle energy healing and courses based on the teachings of their Japanese-American parent organizations. Like Art of Living, the Reiki groups operate in the border area between health science and spirituality, but in contrast to Art of Living openly present their work as 'spiritual' techniques. Like the latter-day Reiki parent organizations overseas (cf. Melton 2001), they can be highly eclectic. This is exemplified by Kusnul Hadi's book *Reiki Tao Kundalini dalam Rambu-Rambu Islam* (2001). There he gives instructions for practices that will facilitate healing of bodily ills, make the Muslim reader's prayers more spiritually focused (*khusuk*) and raise the Kundalini vital energy to highest cakra.

*Home-grown eclectic groups:* Anand Krishna's Anand Ashram and One Earth One Sky retreat centre deftly respect the official requirement for Indonesians to have a single exclusive 'religion' while at the same time offering students the opportunity to recognize the common threads, as he sees it, in all religions. The Ashram provides shrines for all the recognized religions and numerous others besides. His graded courses in spiritual development teach adaptations of Hindu pranayama, Reiki, Zen and 'Sufi whirling.' Sessions open and close with chants blending prayers from Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. His addresses invariably point out correspondences in the teachings of several religions. Most students come to the ashram after finding and enjoying his books, now over forty, which offer his 'appreciations' of all the major religions.

Gde Prana draws primarily on Indonesian spiritual traditions, as he understands them, but integrates those understandings with techniques from the international growth movement literature on human relations and management. More pragmatically oriented, his product range is shifting from books and courses for the public to high-priced management consultancy to major firms.

*Universalist Sufi groups:* Two groups have recently formed in Jakarta around highly universalist conceptions of Sufi gnosis. Both of them operate informally without concern for registration either with the Department of Religion or the 'faiths' office. Yayasan Thoha has its origins in a *pengajian* (a Qur'an study group) organized around the teacher KH Rachmat Hidayat. Bapak Rachmat had an initiation in a line of Sufi teaching connecting him with the legendary Javanese Muslim saint Sunan Kudus, and through him to the Prophet's nephew Ali and so to the Prophet, as required of orthodox Sufi teachers. His metaphysics, however, are those of the Unity of Being school, associated with Ibn Arabi and Hamzah Fansuri. In the early 1990s one of Jakarta's leading bankers and a highly cosmopolitan 'seeker' became a student of Bapak Rachmat and drew others of his chief executive circle to Pak Rachmat's *pengajian*. Their circle, now constituted as the Thoha Foundation (Yayasan Thoha), came to accentuate the supremacy of Truth accessed in mystical perception (*makrifat*) to any revelation encapsulated in words and books, including the Qur'an, Christian or Jewish scriptures, Gita or Tao Te Ching. This opened the door for the initiation of people from non-Muslim backgrounds and the explicit acceptance in Yayasan Thoha that the path to truth exists in all religions.

Another group formed by Indonesian cosmopolitans, Pusaka Hati, has for the past four years brought to Jakarta teachers and facilitators from two international universalist Sufi organizations, a Mevlevi order under Kabir Helminski, based in the San Francisco area, and the Beshara Esoteric School based in Scotland. Kabir's Sufism is universalized through the admission of participants regardless of religious background. So also is the Beshara School, but in its case its universalism in practice is underwritten by its teaching of the Unity of Being metaphysics of Ibn Arabi.

## **Conclusions**

In this paper I have called attention to changing usages of words relating to interiorized religiosity and cultivation of mystical states, noting the separation over the twentieth

century of the notion of ‘inward’ (*batin*) religiosity from Islam proper, its formalization in the *kebatinan* movement, and, at the end of the twentieth century, its administrative restriction to the fading *kepercayaan* or ‘faiths’ groups. In its place, ‘spirituality,’ a concept adopted from the global spiritual marketplace but grounded in the new, indigenous Sufi revival of the later twentieth century, is being used to reconnect the idea of an intimate awareness of immanent Divinity and ‘religion’ (*agama*) proper. It has also laid the basis for sincere, committed Muslims and adherents of other ‘religions’ to explore a wide array of new activities and groups promoting the ‘spiritual’ outside the official bounds of ‘religion’ in an arena no longer regulated by the government office charged with controlling the ‘faiths.’

If in the Western world, however, we commonly hear nowadays the expression ‘religion no, spirituality yes!’ in Indonesia the appropriation of the word ‘spirituality’ rarely implies an actual rejection of formal religion. The profession of a formal, ‘world’ religion remains a legal obligation of citizenship that if anything is embraced more enthusiastically than ever. However the mid-century high-modern construction of religion in scripturalist terms, as the punctilious observance of ritual and religious law without a suspect ‘irrational’ emotional or mystical component, is now widely rejected. So also is the authority of traditional legal scholars who cannot win the respect of an intellectually enquiring and broadly educated Muslim public. The educated Muslim public now seek out forms of religious expression and spiritual understanding that are satisfying to them and meet their own standards of scholarly integrity.

My way of understanding these changes in patterns and constructions of religiosity has been to see those changes both as responses to the exigencies of the particular local (i.e., Indonesian) historical context and as instances of universal trends in religious behavior associated with modernization and globalization. Most relevant here is the trend, noted by Beyer (1994), Eisenstadt (1999) and others, towards a polarization of modes of religiosity across the world as populations become knit more closely into global networks of communications and exchange in the late modern era. In Indonesia, this was suppressed under the New Order regime, when substantial economic development and social modernization was taking place, but erupted dramatically in the Reformasi period (since 1998). The fundamentalist, totalizing pole of religious response in this period has been well documented. This paper contributes towards the documentation and understanding of the opposite pole, liberal responses in the same period, heretofore understood almost exclusively through their exegetical and explicitly political expressions, rather than, as here, through changes in popular practice.

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