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Asia-Pacific Magazine
No. 3 June 1996
pp. 5-9.

Japan and the Bomb: a cause for concern?

by Andrew Mack

Is Northeast Asia moving towards a period of growing instability as some analysts and commentators have suggested? Suggestive evidence is not difficult to find. China is involved in a major military build-up, is continuing to test nuclear weapons in defiance of world opinion, and has been using its military muscle to intimidate Taiwan. The bitter wrangling over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands continues unabated and the Korean peninsula is the only area in the world, apart from the Taiwan Straits, where a massive military confrontation persists between two large and modern armies.

Underpinning these concerns is a pervasive, if muted, concern that the United States may at some stage abandon its security commitments to the region and withdraw its forces. Some regional security planners, particularly in the Koreas and China, worry that, without American protection, Japan would seek to become a "normal" country, like Britain or France. Being "normal" in this context means acquiring offensive weapons systems to replace those provided by the U.S. It could also mean the acquisition of Japanese nuclear weapons to replace the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Is it really possible that Japan would seek to acquire nuclear weapons? Most analysts believe it is most unlikely. They point out that successive postwar Japanese governments have shown a strong and indeed growing commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, while most Japanese citizens are both anti-militarist and anti-nuclear.

But regional concerns about Japan and nuclear weapons persist for a number of reasons. First, the nuclear option has been discussed by the Japanese Government in the past. Outline of Our Nation's Diplomatic Policy, an official report produced in 1969, argued that Japan could not rely indefinitely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella given America's continued economic decline and recommended that Japan acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The recommendation was not accepted, but the fact that such a report could be commissioned and could make such a recommendation, indicates such ideas were not considered outlandish. this was the period in which the Nixon administration had demanded that its regional allies take greater responsibility for their own defence, and in which both Taiwan and South Korea had embarked on the first of their many unsuccessful attempts to acquire nuclear weapons technology.

Second, some of Japan's political leaders have expressed views which indicate a less than total opposition to the idea of a Japanese nuclear weapon capability. Prime Ministers Kishi (in 1957), Ohira (in 1979) and Nakasone (in 1984) all stated that acquiring nuclear weapons would not be prohibited by Japan's peace constitution - provided they were used for defence, not offence. Japan's Defense Agency has echoed this view. In 1967 Prime Minister Sato stated that the three non-nuclear principles, which commit Japan not to produce or possess nuclear weapons, or allow them to be deployed on Japanese soil, were not immutable and could be changed.

Evidence that at least some leading politicians still have not ruled out the nuclear option came in July 1993, when Foreign Minister Kabun Muto discussing the threat that Japan perceived from North Korea, stated that, "if it comes to the crunch, possessing the will that `we can do it' - make nuclear weapons - is important". In June 1994, in response to a query during question time, Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata declared that Japan already had "the capability to produce nuclear weapons".

In March 1994, the Japan Strategic Study Center, a hawkish and influential private think tank, which is chaired by leading opposition spokesperson, Ichiro Ozawa, and staffed by very senior retired military officers, produced a report which can only have added to regional concerns. It called on the Government "...to remove public fear of nuclear arms and to come up with realistic nuclear policies".

Ambivalent bureaucratic attitudes to nuclear weapons acquisition were also evident on occasion in the 1990s. In June 1993, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials resisted U.S. pressure for an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that so doing would "tie the hands of future governments in Tokyo if new security threats arise". The official resistance was overcome, but not before creating the impression that sections of Japan's security community were reluctant to forego the nuclear option. In early June 1994, the Japanese Government indicated that it would inform the International Court of Justice in the Hague that it did not consider the use of nuclear weapons as illegal.

In the past the U.S. has also expressed doubts about Japan's nuclear intentions. In 1966, for example, a high-level meeting of U.S. officials considered "the possibility of a nuclear-sharing agreement with Japan". The purpose of the agreement was to try "...to stop the Japanese from seeking an independent nuclear capability".

But the issue which raises greatest concern in the region is Japan's deep commitment to the plutonium economy. It is not hard to see why. Much of the controversy about North Korea's nuclear program over the past five years has centred on whether or not the North had produced and illicitly diverted enough plutonium for one or two small nuclear weapons. Japan's existing stockpiles of separated plutonium are already large enough for hundreds of nuclear weapons. (Separation is the difficult and complex process of extracting plutonium from spent reactor fuel.) Weapons-grade plutonium is the fissile material of choice for most nuclear weapons states. Japanese officials are quick to point out that Japanese plutonium is reactor-grade - it derives from the commercial power reactors which provide more than a third of Japan's energy needs. They argue that no state has ever made nuclear weapons from reactor-grade plutonium and that it is not a source of proliferation concern.

But claims that reactor-grade plutonium cannot be used to make nuclear weapons are simply incorrect. Although it can be hazardous to handle and has a less reliable explosive yield than weapons-grade plutonium, reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make bombs in the Hiroshima range. Indeed the U.S. exploded just such weapons in 1962.

It is the sheer amount of Japanese plutonium which causes most concern. A November 1994 report by Japan's Atomic Energy Commission stated that there were 4.7 tons of separated plutonium in Japan and a further 6 tons in storage in Europe. By contrast the intense concern over North Korea's possible illicit diversion of fissile material related to a relatively tiny quantity of plutonium - between 10 and 15 kgs.

The very large quantity of weapons-useable plutonium which will be separated in Japan's reprocessing facilities in future has raised the question of possible illicit diversion. Very small percentages of plutonium could in principle be diverted during the separation process without detection by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. One per cent of 10 tons of plutonium would be enough for perhaps 15 Hiroshima-sized bombs. A recent report by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment on nuclear safeguards specifically referred to Japan when it noted that, "to date, the IAEA has not considered the possibility that it may be unable to safeguard effectively large quantities such as the Rokkashomura reprocessing plant now under construction in Japan, but neither has it been able to demonstrated that it can".

But Japan has generally been scrupulous in its observation of nuclear safeguards and illicit diversion of fissile material is not the most important source of proliferation concern. As North Korea reminded the world in March 1993, states can legally withdraw from the NPT on provision of three months notice. If Japan believed that "extraordinary events" related to the subject matter of the NPT were jeopardising its "supreme interests", it could exercise its right under Article X of the Treaty and withdraw. (Extraordinary events could include the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea.) It could then - perfectly legally - use its plutonium stockpile to build a large nuclear arsenal.

The energy security argument, which has provided the central justification for Japanese involvement in the plutonium economy, does not seem compelling to many outside observers. So-called fast breeder reactors, which are the key feature of the plutonium economy, are a source of proliferation concern because they produce more plutonium than they consume and far more than do standard light-water reactors. Most countries have abandoned their fast-breeder programs on grounds of either safety or excessive cost.

The cost issue puzzles many analysts. There is currently a global uranium glut, uranium prices have plunged and fast breeders have, according to David Sanger, become "...five to 15 times more expensive to run than conventional nuclear power plants", while "burning" plutonium in mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuels, as Japan does, is also uneconomic. So why has Japan not abandoned an energy generation process which appears so extraordinarily uneconomic?

If the economic arguments for Japan's involvement in the plutonium economy are so unpersuasive it is hardly surprising that regional states should ask what other motives the Japanese might have for creating so much plutonium. One possible motive would, of course, be to acquire a stockpile of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

However, much of the concern about Japan's commitment to the plutonium economy would be reduced if critics understood the long time horizons of Japan's energy planners. Arguments about the current lack of economic viability of fast breeder reactors and "burning" MOX, simply miss the point for Japan's energy planners. As Satsuki Eda, Director of the Science and Technology Agency, has argued, "we have to look at the distant future, at the 21st and even the 22nd century, and think of the economics in these terms". Japanese officials argue that the current uranium glut will not last, and that uranium prices will therefore rise, as will oil prices. Both trends, they suggest, will make fast breeder reactors an economic proposition in the long term. Tokyo has also laid great stress on the importance of nuclear energy as a means of reducing the risks of global warming.

Over the past three years Japan has become more sensitive to regional - and domestic - concerns about its plutonium economy. Partly in response to the controversy over a shipment of plutonium from France in 1993 the Government is now trying actively to sell the virtues of the plutonium economy. (The plutonium had been extracted in France from Japanese spent fuel.) Nuclear "transparency" has replaced secrecy and a Nuclear White Paper is now published which, among other things, details the size of Japan's fissile material stockpiles. In July 1994, Science and Technology Minister Makiko Tanaka called for Japan's plutonium stocks to be placed under international management and control - although what this might mean in practice is not clear.

The most significant move, however, came in mid-1994 when the Government announced that it was scaling back the plutonium program. The fast breeder and reprocessing programs would be put back some 10 years, although there would be increasing emphasis on domestic reprocessing.

While there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Japan's security planners intend to acquire nuclear weapons, some almost certainly believe that demonstrating certain technical capabilities can serve a useful security purpose. This certainly seems to be a South Korean perception. In this view it is possible for nuclear deterrence to exist without nuclear weapons actually being produced. The phenomenon has been called "virtual deterrence". The point of "virtual deterrence" is simple: Japan could build and deploy nuclear weapons far more quickly than any regional adversary could hope to build a conventional force capable of mounting a successful invasion of Japanese territory. ("Virtual deterrence" only works against future conventional threats - it cannot deter nuclear threats from states which already have nuclear weapons.)

Estimates of the time it would take Japan to produce nuclear weapons vary from a few months to a year, while the highly sophisticated Japanese space-launch program could swiftly be retooled to build intermediate-range ballistic missiles able to carry nuclear warheads. Japan's latent nuclear weapons capabilities can thus in themselves be an effective deterrent - deterrence without the bomb in effect. One intended (or possibly unintended) consequence of Japan's acquisition of large stocks of plutonium may be to reinforce this message in the region.

But if the logic of "virtual deterrence" is clear enough, so too are the risks. Insofar as "virtual deterrence" is compelling for Japan, it may seem equally attractive to other states; indeed some South Korean security planners and analysts have proposed that South Korea acquire plutonium separation capabilities essentially for this reason. The proliferation risk arises because in a climate of deteriorating political relationships, pressures to realise nuclear potentials could become acute.

U.S. officials say that Japan's commitment to reprocessing complicates U.S. anti-proliferation policies in the region, while South Korean security analysts frequently reiterate both their concerns about Japan's plutonium program and their resentment that South Korea like Taiwan, but unlike Japan, has been prevented by the U.S. from acquiring its own plutonium via reprocessing.

As long as Japan remains enmeshed in the U.S. security relationship and sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella, the so-called Japanese Gaullists who advocate the acquisition of nuclear weapons will remain a tiny minority. But there is little doubt that support for the nuclear option in Japan would grow if the U.S. security commitment appeared to be eroding, especially if the Japanese were simultaneously concerned about a deteriorating regional security climate. Evidence that other regional powers were actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons would tilt the political balance still further in the pro-nuclear direction.

Japan's propensity to proliferate would seem to be directly related to its confidence in America's long term commitment to the U.S./Japan alliance. But with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the central rationale for the forward deployment of U.S. forces in the region disappeared. The U.S. now claims that its regional economic interests gives it a stake in regional stability and cause to stay militarily engaged. This is not very persuasive since no other state in the world feels it necessary to deploy forces onto the other side of the globe simply because it has important economic interests there.

The current administration is committed to remaining engaged in the region, as are the Departments of State and Defense. But isolationists in Congress strongly oppose spending billions of dollars of U.S. tax-payers' money to defend rich Asian states from non-existent threats. The fact that these states pursue trading practices that are believed to harm U.S. interests, only serves to increase support for reducing U.S. commitments. Isolationist forces lack the support necessary to derail America's Asia security policy, but they could succeed in the long term.

Pressure for disengagement is not only evident on the U.S. side. In Japan anti-U.S. sentiments have run high following the rape scandal in Okinawa, while rancorous trade tensions have also contributed to the general decline in pro-American, pro-alliance, sentiments among the Japanese people.

While pro-nuclear forces would undoubtedly increase their political support in Japan if the U.S. security commitments began to erode, it is by no means certain that they would prevail. Western - and Korean - critics who argue that Japan would seek to acquire nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. withdrawal, too often ignore the strong Japanese preference for non-military approaches to maintaining security and almost certainly underestimate the powerful domestic and regional political constraints against nuclear weapons. The latter include the three-non-nuclear principles adopted by the Diet in 1968, and the fact that domestic public opinion is intensely and overwhelmingly anti-nuclear - for obvious reasons. Japanese politicians are also acutely aware of regional sensitivities towards any signs of revived Japanese militarism.

Tokyo has recently re-emphasised its anti-nuclear credentials with unusually tough responses to the recent round of French tests and the ongoing Chinese test program. The Japanese have also been highly supportive of the IAEA, and have promoted the idea of an Asian version of Euratom, a region-wide consortium that would facilitate regular exchanges of experts and information. In addition, Japan has collaborated with the U.S. and South Korea in seeking to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, and has launched a $100 million assistance program to help Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan dismantle nuclear weapons.

Such actions would make little sense for a government contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and any attempt to reverse Japan's broad and much-publicised anti-nuclear posture would involve a massive loss of face for Tokyo. Finally, the long-term Japanese ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council would be seriously jeopardised if it became known that Tokyo had even contemplated violating its international legal obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Regional concern is likely to persist, however, as long as Japan retains its commitment to a plutonium economy that the overwhelming majority of the world's industrial states have rejected. Japan would do the global cause of non-proliferation a great service by following their example.

Further reading:

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Interntaional House of Japan, The United States and Japan, and the Future of Nuclear Weap[ons, Washington DC, 1995.
• Manning Robert A., "Rethinking Japan's Plutinium Policy', Journal of East Asian Affairs 10(1) (Winter/Spring, 1995).
• Mack, Andrew, Nuclear Policies for Northeast Asia, United Nations, 1955.

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